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Summary Findings
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's developing countries viewed UNCTAD rather than the GATT as the main institution through which they could promote their interests in international trade. Beginning with the Uruguay Round in the mid 1980's however, the developing countries attitude changed: Many more became members of the GATT and a significant number played an active role in the Uruguay Round negotiations. The paper analyses the representation and participation of the developing countries in the WTO as of mid-1997 in order to determine whether the developing countries can effectively promote their interests and discharge their responsibilities under the rules and agreements of the new Organization.
The paper concludes that a duality in the representation and participation of developing countries in the WTO has emerged: On the one hand there are many developing countries which have increased significantly their capacity to participate in WTO activities in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round and whose representatives are playing an active role in the decisions of the organization. Their participation in formal and informal decision making processes is substantial, although they frequently do not speak with one voice as their interests, depending on the issue, may diverge and result in the forming of different coalitions. On the other hand, there is an even larger group of primarily smaller and lower income developing countries, which account for more than 50% of total WTO developing country membership, for which effective representation and participation in the Organization's activities is still a serious problem. Their situation has changed little since the early 1980's. Most are not represented in Geneva and hence can not effectively participate in the consultations leading to the development of consensus on which the WTO is based. Their staffing has not increased significantly, while the complexity of the issues and the number of meetings and obligations in the WTO has multiplied significantly.
For many developing countries and especially for the least developed and some of the smaller island economies, institutional weaknesses are the major constraints in both meeting their obligations under the WTO and in effective participation in the Organization and representation of their interests. Institutional development is a complex process, that takes a great deal of time. As a consequence, the solution of the problems of representation of the developing countries in the WTO is neither easy nor amenable to quick, stroke-of-the-pen changes in policies or rules.
The major recommendations for more effective participation are as follows:
First, participation would be enhanced through the establishment of adequate staffed WTO Missions based in Geneva. Measures to increase effective representation in Geneva, however, should be taken pari passu with measures to strengthen the institutional capacity at home, as part of a broader decision to become more effectively integrated in the international trading system. Developing countries need to initiate efforts to strengthen the policy making and implementation capacity of institutions that affect their ability to trade as well as to seek assistance for this purpose from international donors and the WTO itself.
Second, for some countries with very small international representation in general, it may not be optimal use of scarce human and material resources to set up such Geneva Missions. In such cases, the main objective should be twofold: (a) to ensure that they have adequate information flow on the issues handled by the WTO and how they affect their interests; and (b) to identify like minded countries or groups which do have effective representation, develop a process of consultation with them and thereby obtain some assurance that their interests are reflected on an ongoing basis. To this end, countries need to explore inter alia whether they can pool their resources and representation in Geneva in the context of regional groupings to which they belong, or alternatively, whether they can second one or more staff to already established Missions in Geneva of like-minded countries.
Third, countries need to ensure that the effectiveness of their participation is not impaired by such matters as not paying their membership dues. The amounts involved are typically very small; falling in arrears in their payments can not be a cost effective policy even in circumstances of countries facing serious budget constraints.
Fourth, the international community should place higher priority to the more effective integration of the developing countries in the international trading system and their participation in the WTO. While many developing countries have made great strides in this connection, institutional weaknesses are glaring and impose serious constraints in many others, especially the Least Developed. Donors in general, and the Bretton Woods institutions, UNDP, WTO, UNCTAD and the ITC in particular, should increase their support and assistance to well co-ordinated programs of institutional development that enhance the capacity of developing countries --whether on the Least Developed country list or not--to participate effectively in the international trading system, and to permit them to meet their obligations in the WTO. Such an institutional strengthening is a sine qua non for effective representation of developing country interests in the WTO, as well as for the accession to the WTO of countries which are not yet members.
Fifth, the WTO should undertake a review of its internal rules and procedures--such as the rule that delegations of countries presenting cases before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) include only government employees--to ensure that they do not inadvertedly prejudice the effective participation of developing countries.
It would also appear desirable for the WTO to increase the resources it allocates from its own budget to provide assistance to developing countries to enable them to discharge the obligations entailed by membership in the Organization as well as to assist others to accede. This does not necessarily mean that the WTO should increase its own staffing for undertaking technical assistance activities. It does mean that the WTO should allocate an appropriate amount of resources from its budget to the tasks of supporting effective participation of all its membership in its activities and assisting needy non-members in their accession process, so as to become a truly global institution.
THE PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO

I. Introduction
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, developing countries viewed UNCTAD rather than GATT as the main institution through which they could promote their interests in international trade. Their representation in GATT reflected these priorities: Many developing countries were not members, and of those that were, a large number did not maintain official representatives resident in Geneva, but instead used representatives in other European capitals to cover GATT matters --for ACP countries usually their Mission to the EU in Brussels. Moreover, their participation in GATT negotiations prior to the Uruguay Round, was "passive" in that they did not engage in a significant way in the mutual exchange of concessions on a reciprocal basis (Whalley, 1987) .
Beginning with the Uruguay Round, developing countries' attitude towards participation in the GATT and, subsequently, in the WTO changed significantly: Many developing countries played a very active role in the Uruguay Round negotiations; and a large number decided to become members ofWTO. This attitude change reflects anumber of complex and inter-relateddevelopments: Developing countries, in general, have become more effectively integrated in the international trading system, and several have become major exporters of manufactures. Trade policies in many countries have been liberalized, favouring an outward orientation and lower protection. And, there has been a growing appreciation of the importance of observing international rules in the conduct of trade as well as the need to safeguard trading interests through effective participation in the activities of the new organization. and (c) institutional capacity in home capitals, which is necessary for both effective representation and participation. Based on this analysis, the last part of the paper draws a number of conclusions and recommnendations for the more effective participation of developing countries in the WTO.
'The participation of the developing countries in these negotiations will be only noted in passing rather than analyzed in depth. The participation of the developing countries in the Uruguay Round has been discussed extensively elsewhere (see especially Croome 1995 , Martin and Winters 1996 , and UNCTAD and WTO, 1996 , and is not going to be addressed in this paper.
II. The Data
The basic information used for the analysis of representation was provided by the WTO/GATT But of course, numbers and formal representation and chairmanships do not tell the whole story.
Informal arrangements work along with and sometime supersede the formal committee structure and arrangements. Information on these informal processes of developing consensus is hard to document.
In some cases, the groups involved and their membership is a matter of public record. In other cases, they are not, and the analysis presented here has had to rely on personal interviews with the information provided on condition of no attribution. It was also thought that Mission size would also be affected by a country's geographical proximity to Geneva. Were this to be an important factor, it would tend to bias downward the Mission size of developed, European countries. It turns out, that if that bias exists, it does not show in the statistics, as the European countries are substantially represented in Geneva -both through their national missions and, for EC matters, through the EC. On the other hand, the distance of most developing countries from Geneva means that participation in the activities of the organization by representatives from their capitals is quite costly and raises the importance of having effective representation located in Geneva.
III. Membership
The first point to note is the familiar one that developing countries now account for 74 % of WTO membership compared to 66% in 1982 (Table 1) Table 1 ) .' At present, total WTO membership accounts for over 90% of world exports, compared to slightly more than 75% in 1982. The largest exporting countries/territories currently not members are China, Chinese Taipei, Russia and Saudi Arabia. 5
Over the same period, the proportion of world exports accounted by developing country members of the WTO increased even more, from 11 % in 1982 to 19% in 1996 (Table 1) . This was both because of an increase in developing country membership, and because of the rapid expansion of developing country exports in the 1990's. Overall however, developing countries continue to represent a much larger proportion of WTO membership than their share of international trade.
The data on membership nonetheless, disguise the fact that a large number of developing countries have been at any point in time formally "inactive" for not having paid their WTO dues for more 4 The following countries or groups are defined as "developed" and "other" for the purposes of this paper: "Developed" include the fifteen members of the European Communities, the representative of the European Commission, the four EFTA countries (Liechtenstein,Iceland,Norway, Switzerland), Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States; "Other" include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,Hungary, Israel, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sloveniaand Yugoslavia(not aWTO member); all remaining countries and territories are classified as "developing".
5 WTO members can be countries or customs territories, such as e.g.Hong Kong, which has been a member while formally a colony of the UK and now a part of China. Similarly, the European Communities are a member with a separate delegation from those of the 15 fifteen constituent states. For purposes of simplicity, the paper uses the term "country" whatever the legal status of the member may be. than three years. 6 At the beginning of 1997, 23 developing countries/territories were so designated.
Such a designation implies that they are not able to receive technical assistance from the organization, nor have their representatives chair WTO bodies, the withholding of a number of other privileges, such as the distribution of documents etc.' Another seven developing countries were more than one or two years in arrears and were therefore barred from chairing WTO bodies. Thus, thirty developing countries i.e. about a third of the total membership, was barred from chairmanships. Twenty of these were least developed countries. Fifteen had no Missions in Geneva and many others had only token representation.
IV. Representation
Location of Missions. Today, while 64 developing countries members maintain WTO Missions in Geneva, 26 others continue to be represented by Missions or Embassies elsewhere in Europe and seven more list as their representatives people located in Ministries at their own capitals (see Table 2a and Annex). Cameron: 1997. 9 This is much larger than the expansion of WTO secretariat staff over the same period --which went from 340 in 1982 to 383 in 1987 and 515 in 1997, using the Directory as the basis. The two listings are not comparable, however, because the secretariat list includes support staff. As the professional staff in the secretariat --excluding interpreters and translators, does not exceed 200, both the absolute and the relative increase of WTO professional secretariat staff over the period is likely to have been much smaller than the expansion of Mission staff. The average size of Mission increased both for developed and developing countries. The average size Mission for developed countries increased from 4.1 persons in 1982 to 6.7 persons in 1997 or more than 50%. For developing countries the average rose exactly by 50% from 2.4 to 3.6 persons per Mission (see Table 2 ). " Thus, the difference in the average size of Mission actually increased over the past fifteen years." 2 The fact that the average Mission for the developing countries continues to be substantially lower and the difference with developed countries is increasing, should not necessarily be interpreted as an indicator of relative capacity for effective representation on issues of interest at the WTO for the developing countries as a whole. This is because in this, as in so many areas, the average for developing countries is quite misleading as it disguises very large variations.
At the one extreme is a group of LDCs or small, low income countries as well as a large number '"Only five countries (Burundi, Gabon, Malaysia, Portugal and Congo) had less mission staff working on WTO/GATT issues in 1997 than in 1982 -and in only a few of these cases it would appear that the reductions were policy driven.
"The average size of mission in the "other" category, mostly transition economies, did not change. and territories did not meet it because they did not have a Mission in Geneva; another 17 had a Mission, almost always as part of a joint UN mission, but with less than three staff (including the head of Mission) assigned to WTO tasks. In addition, there were another six countries, which while having a nominally adequately sized Mission in Geneva, (in all cases, joint with the UN and thus harder to judge on the division of responsibilities) had arrears problems, as a consequence of which either they were formally "inactive" or could not have their representatives elected to WTO bodies. This gives a total of 56, or close to 60% of the total developing countries members of the WTO being in some fashion handicapped in being effectively represented. a number of groups that functioned before under a "lower authority" of a multilateral code, such as the anti-dumping committee, or customs valuation were incorporated into the more formal committee structure of the WTO. But the breakdown is helpful in bringing out some interesting points about developing country representation and is used primarily for this purpose.
' 4 The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the GATT Contracting Parties have been included in the list of "iimportant" chairmanships although their functions were mostly ceremonial. According to GATT practice these positions were held by representatives of countries which the previous year held the same positions in the GATT General Council.
The main findings are presented in Table 3 . The Table shows that over the fifteen years covered, developing countries increased substantially the absolute number of "important" chairmanships they hold. Indeed, both in 1987 and in 1997 they held in absolute terms more important chairmanships than the developed countries ( but not by a large margin). In all cases their proportion of chairmanships is lower than their share of the total membership of the institution but higher than their share of international trade. The picture that emerges from looking at the other, lesser chairmanships however, is entirely different. Both in 1982 an in 1987, very few chairmanships went to developing countries. This is in part due to the fact that most of the groups involved focused on the activities of the implementation of the multilateral codes in which developing country participation was very limited. Developing The implications of the findings on chairmanships should not be exaggerated. They do suggest that the WTO as an institution is formally flexible enough to accommodate an increasing interest on the part of developing countries. Whether this translates into moving forward issues of importance to the agenda of the developing countries is a somewhat more complex issue, however. Preparation and presentation of issues does not hinge primarily on the holding of chairmanships or leadership positions. It is based on a lot of preparatory work and institutional capability in capitals; it is also based on the development of points of common interest with similarly minded countries and delegations.
Informal Consultations. Any institution such as the WTO, and the GATT before it, which is based on consensus must develop a variety of processes both formal and informal, in order to reach decisions. In principle, any single member of the institution can block a decision by casting a negative vote. It was clear, even in the context of the GATT where the developing countries had a majority of the votes but played a decidedly lesser role, that it would be futile to attempt to exercise voting strength either to block major progress or to force developed countries to implement obligations not freely accepted (Evans 1968) . In practice there is rarely, if ever, any voting. This puts a premium on consultation, both formal and informal, that builds consensus.
As the WTO now has more than 130 members, it is very difficult to conduct consultations, or for that matter any kind of business activity, when everybody has to be consulted about everything.
Thus, while the General Council, the ultimate decision making body where all members are represented, as well as all the various subsidiary bodies and committees meet frequently, informal consultations take place even more often. When issues of importance to the Organization as a whole require consultations, these usually involve the Director General and a smaller group of members, that include the major trading countries, both developed and developing, and others who are judged to be representative of the views of the remaining membership. The actual composition of this group (called the "Green Room Group" because it meets at the Director General's green conference room) tends to vary by issue. But on issues of general importance to the organization it could consist of upwards of thirty members. Given that in such meetings, the representative of the European Commission speaks on behalf of the fifteen members of the European Communities, developing countries, typically form the majority of "voices" in such consultations.' 6 " 6 For a period in the late 1970's and early 1980's an effort was made to formalize the establishment of a smaller group of countries which would be used as a vehicle for regular consultations in the GATT. This so called "Consultative Group of Eighteen" included 10 developing countries. Although from time to time there have been suggestions to revive such a group in the context of the WTO, it has not been possible to reconstitute such a group, in part because of difficulties in accommodating all the various countries who would want to participate, because they would not feel that other members would adequately represent their interests. As a consequence the present loose and flexible consultation formula has remained in place. It is interesting in this regard that neither the weighted voting nor the related representation formula, whereby one country represents a number of others (frequently of vastly different level of development) present in the decision making bodies of the IMF and the World Bank, has been at all in favour in the WTO. It also interesting to note that despite the disparity between trade weights and voting strength, both the GATT and the WTO have been able to function perhaps for the reasons discussed by Evans (1968) .
Developing countries often do not have a common position on major issues before the WTO.
There is a Developing Country Group in the WTO that holds consultations from the time to time; and the developing countries consult on trade policies issues of importance to them in the context of the G-77 in UNCTAD. However, the establishment of common positions, that will encompass all the developing countries members of the WTO as a group, is becoming more of a challenge as there are growing disparities in their income levels, their trading interests, their integration in the international economy, their institutional capacities and their participation in WTO affairs. Some of these countries, e.g. Korea, Mexico and Turkey, are also members of the OECD and on some issues share the outlook of the developed countries members of that group. Others, find that, on some issues, their interests tend to coincide with developed country members and hence participate in groups with mixed developeddeveloping country memberships.
Agriculture is one such issue. The "Cairns Group", perhaps the most well known and formal of these groups, consists of a mixed membership of exporters of agricultural products, and includes such countries as Australia, but also Argentina, Hungary and Thailand. The interests of these exporters may at times be quite different from those of a large number of developing countries which are net importers of foodstuffs.
Two other informal groups of mixed membership are worth noting: The so called "Invisible Group" consists of officials from trade ministries of major trading countries, balanced between both developed and developing countries (including the so-called "quad" group of Canada, the EC, Japan and the US, but also such developing countries as Brazil, India and Korea). It meets in Geneva, perhaps twice a year, with the participation of the Director General to discuss, usually in general terms, upcoming issues of importance to the WTO. The other, is the so called "Beau-Rivage Group", which includes the Geneva based representatives of a number of smaller countries both developed and developing, that share an active participation in WTO affairs and a commitment to the multilateral trading system. 17
In addition to these groups, the development of a consensus involves numerous other meetings in formal or informal settings. For example, developing countries consult in regional groupings, such as the Africa group or ASEAN as well as in context of groups with a wider agenda such the G-15, or in the context of sectorally oriented bodies such as International Textiles and Clothing Bureau or in smaller caucuses among like-rninded countries whose composition sometimes includes both developed and developing countries. The 30-35 developing countries with an active representation at the WTO are usually important participants in these consultations. One of the problems that some developing countries have voiced is that they lack an institutional structure such as the one provided by OECD for the developed countries in which to undertake research and analyses as well as develop proposals of interest to a large group of developing countries, which can then be presented at the WTO for consideration by its full membership.' 8 The Agenda. New Issues and Agreements. Partly because of the lack of such a forum and partly because of their own institutional weaknesses, many developing countries feel handicapped in contributing to settting the WTO agenda. As in other fields, the largest number of participants in the recently concluded agreements on Telecommunications, Information Technology and Financial Services agreements reached in the WTO during 1997 are developing countries. However, the initiative for all three agreements, as well for the "new issues" that have emerged on the WTO agenda following the Singapore Ministerial, came in large measure from the developed countries, which also account for the bulk of world trade in the goods and services involved. At the same time, it is quite clear that ' 7 This is similar in composition and orientation with the "De la Paix Group" active during the Uruguay Round. ' 8 0n some issues, e.g. investment, developing countries continue to look to UNCTAD as an institution in which such analyses and positions can be developed. UNCTAD has also provided a forum for discussion of broader aspects of a trade policy agenda for developing countries (see e.g. UNCTAD 1997).
none of the agreements could have been put in place without the active support provided by a number of developing countries from East Asia and Latin America.
VI.
Institutional Capacitv
Effective participation in the WTO and representation of developing country interests depends critically on the development of an adequate institutional capacity in the developing countries themselves.
The increasing range and complexity of issues handled by the WTO, some of which are becoming very technical, implies that the capacity of developing countries to participate effectively in the work of the WTO will depend very heavily on the analytical capacity and strength of the governmental and other institutions handling the range of WTO issues in capitals. This is all the more so in the WTO, a member driven organization, with a very small secretariat, where a great deal of the analysis of issues and development of positions is done by the members, usually in capitals.
Institutional weaknesses of developing countries have received fonnal recognition in the Uruguay
Round agreements which contain provisions for special and differential treatment of developing countries in a number of areas especially in Sanitary and Phytosanitary, Standards and TRIPS, permitting longer implementation periods and/or the provision of technical assistance to strengthen their institutional capacity to meet their obligations under the agreements. Developing countries face a variety of challenges in this regard: the drafting of appropriate legislation and regulations, the meeting of procedural notification requirements, the staffing of government institutions with technical personnel able to implement the policies and commitments undertaken and the monitoring of trading partners' implementation of WTO obligations to assess whether market access has been unfairly denied or trade rights infringed --as well as to prepare an appropriate response (UNCTAD and WTO, 1996) .
These weaknesses have been clear for some time, especially in the context of Africa (Oyejide, 1997) . They are frequently glaring for the more than 50 developing countries with weak Given these weaknesses, it is often very difficult for countries to undertake the analytical work required for the development of new initiatives or for responses to proposals prepared by others. As
Oyejide notes, as long as "particular countries were willing to subordinate their interests to those generally articulated by and broadly acceptable to all developing countries, their participation was not particularly resource intensive at the individual country level. Because interests were not extensively differentiated, it was not necessary to be adequately represented at every meeting, nor was it required for such representatives to be supported by full documentation and background information on each issue being discussed and for the negotiators to receive prompt and adequate instructions from their home capitals. The more differentiated nature of their participation has called for support of the types which have never systematically built up over the years" (Oyejide, 1990, p.442 ).
In the absence of institutional capacity in the government, countries have had also to rely on outside consultants to represent them at meetings in the WTO. When this is done without a presence in Geneva, it can lead to confusion and misunderstandings as the Sierra Leone experience of representation at the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment suggests (Chaytor and Hindley, 1997) .
Unless these weaknesses start to be addressed, merely strengthening these countries' representation in Geneva will not go very far in enhancing their participation in the WTO.
The main burden for strengthening institutional capacity has to be borne by the developing countries themselves. However, as Jan Pronk, Chairman of the HLMLDCTD, stated in his opening statement to the meeting "...foreign assistance can help, but often did not. Too often supply driven assistance and incoherent diagnoses from a wide range of development agencies, undercut the domestic will to reform: too much expatriate technical assistance and proliferation of donor schemes overtaxed the domestic capacity to reform and led to confusion and duplication."' 9
A systematic review of the assistance efforts of the international community in support of trade development in developing countries is beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the themes and conclusions drawn from the HLMLDCTD however, are worth noting both because of their relevance to the LDCs whose problems of effective participation in the WTO are most acute and because of their wider applicability to other developing countries.
An important conclusion of the meeting is that it is not the lack of assistance as such that is the problem, but rather that it has been supply driven, not effectively coordinated and the reforms supported are not "owned" by the recipient countries. In recent periods, assistance in the trade field has declined significantly from some donor agencies, e.g. UNDP. In the case of the World Bank, the focus on trade development in general has declined by comparison to the late 1980's and early 1990's.
The World Bank shut down its Geneva office in the early 1990's and the share of its trade related operations relative to the total operations approved in the 1996 fiscal year was half of what it was in fiscal year 1991 (Nogues, 1997) .2° The WTO on the other hand, has increased its technical co-operation activities. But the bulk of the financing for these activities, perhaps as much as three quarters in any ' 9 WTO High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least-Developed Countries' Trade Development, Chairman's Opening Statement, Geneva, October 27, 1997.
'Nogues notes in this connection that, "It would be a historical error of major proportions for the Bank to conclude that because so much has been achieved (in trade reform), there remains no significant progress to be expected from investing additional intellectual and financial resources in this area." ( Nogues, 1997, p.94) .
given year, is funded by trust funds provided by bilateral donors, while the WTO itself typically allocates for technical co-operation activities less than one per cent of its total annual budget.
In order to help address some of the problems faced by the Least Developed Countries the HLMLDCTD adopted an Integrated Framework for trade related technical assistance to support LDCs.
The framework envisages the preparation of needs assessments for technical assistance by the LDCs themselves which are then discussed at Roundtables with the six agencies involved in the effort (IMF, ITC, UNDP, UNCTAD, World Bank and WTO) plus other interested donors, in order to develop an integrated program of technical assistance activities which focus primarily on institution building.
Beyond the Integrated Framework, deliberations at the HLMLDCTD raised two other issues:
That helping LDCs strengthen their institutional capacity may require not only technical assistance, but also financial assistance inter alia for human resource development and trade finance; and that problems of the LDCs are shared by other low income developing countries, and that the differences are primarily a matter of degree.
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
The analysis suggests the emergence of a duality in the representation and participation of developing countries in the WTO: On the one hand there are many developing countries which have increased significantly their capacity to participate in WTO activities in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round and whose representatives are playing an active role in the decisions of the organization. Their participation in formal and informal decision making processes is substantial, although they frequently do not speak with one voice as their interests, depending on the issue, may diverge and result in the forming of different coalitions. This is very much consistent with had been anticipated at the time of the Uruguay Round (Whalley, 1987) . This does not imply that the consultation process always results in the development of a consensus that reflects the interests of the majority of the developing countries. For example, many developing countries felt that in advance of the Singapore Ministerial, their views on some issues, for example the future work of the WTO on investment, were not fully taken into account. But, if there was a problem in that regard, it could not be traced to the absence of effective representation.
On the other hand, there is an even larger group of primarily smaller and lower income developing countries, which account for more than 50 % of total WTO developing country membership, for which effective representation and participation in the Organization's activities is still a serious problem. Their situation has changed little since the early 1980's. Most are not represented in Geneva and hence can not effectively participate in the consultations leading to the development of consensus on which the WTO is based. Their staffing has not increased significantly, while the complexity of the issues and the number of meetings and obligations in the WTO has multiplied significantly.
The fact that the average size of mission increased both for developed and developing countries reflects the increasing complexity and range of issues handled by the WTO. This is probably the main reason for these increases in staffing during a period of explosive improvements in telecommunications and hence in the ability of governments to increase their missions' capacity to comnmunicate rapidly with capitals --and thereby reduce the needs for stationing staff abroad.
For many developing countries and especially for the least developed and some of the smaller island economies, institutional weaknesses are the major constraints in both meeting their obligations under the WTO and in effective participation in the Organization and representation of their interests.
But, it must be recognized that institutional development is a complex process, that takes a great deal of time. As a consequence, the solution of the problems of representation of the developing countries in the WTO is not going to be easy and is not often amenable to quick, stroke-of-the-pen changes -23 -in policies or rules. This being said there are a number of things that can be done, some of which should start now, although their payoff may be long term.
First, developing countries which are not members of the WTO, should apply to accede. There is little to be gained by not being members and the potential that membership offers easily outweighs the costs, especially if one were to consider the risks of adverse discrimination resulting from staying outside the organization that sets the rules by which world trade is conducted. Perhaps the main benefits from participation derive from agreeing to and being legally bound by rules and procedures which pose obstacles to increasing protection in the future as well as access to a dispute settlement body which treats all members equally, irrespective of trading power. For these reasons, membership is beneficial even for countries or territories which are unable to develop in the short run the institutional capacity and the requirements for effective participation discussed earlier.
Second, developing countries which are already members, need to ensure that the effectiveness of their participation is not impaired by such matters as not paying their membership dues. The amounts involved are typically very small; falling in arrears in their payments can not be a cost effective policy even in circumstances of countries facing serious budget constraints.
Third, the matter of effective participation through Geneva Missions of the appropriate size is a complex issue for which there are no general solutions. For some countries with very small international representation in general, it may not be optimal use of scarce human and material resources to set up such Missions. In such cases, the main objective should be twofold: (a) to ensure that they have adequate information flow on the issues handled by the WTO and how they affect their interests; and (b) to identify like rninded countries or groups which do have effective representation, develop a process of consultation with them and thereby obtain some assurance that their interests are reflected on an ongoing basis. Some of the alternatives that countries need to explore in this connection are first, whether they can pool their resources and representation in Geneva in the context of regional groupings to which they belong; and second, to determine whether they can second one or more staff to already established Missions in Geneva of like-minded countries.
2 '
For other countries, measures to increase effective representation in Geneva should be taken paripassu with measures to strengthen their institutional capacity at home, as part of a broader decision to become more effectively integrated in the international trading system. For these countries as well, adequate information flow to the appropriate ministries or other decision making bodies in capitals is essential and should be addressed at the earliest. At the same time, they need to initiate efforts to strengthen the policy making and implementation capacity of these institutions as well as to seek assistance for this purpose from international donors and the WTO itself.
The Integrated Framework of Trade Related Technical Assistance for the Least Developed
Countries should be of help to this group of countries. These countries may also benefit from assistance provided by the Swiss authorities in setting up a physical presence in Geneva. But institutional weaknesses are not limited to the least developed countries; nor should technical and other assistance to strengthen these capacities. Indeed, the Uruguay Round agreements call for the provision of technical assistance to all developing countries in a number of areas, such as SPS and standards. Yet, few developing countries have sought such assistance so far.
Fourth, the WTO should undertake a review of its internal rules and procedures to ensure that they do not inadvertedly prejudice the effective participation of developing countries. An example of one such rule is the provision that delegations of countries presenting cases before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) include only government employees. This implies that developing countries with very 21 Blackhurst (1 997b) recommends that a minimum number of representatives of each WTO mission be funded through the budget of the WTO, much as the Executive Directors and their staff are funded by the budgets of the World Bank and the IMF. While on the face of it such a proposal may seem to have merit, it is not feasible without a major redefinition of the WTO as an institution. The reason is that, unlike the WTO, the Executive Directors of the Bretton Woods institutions play a dual role: they are both representatives of their governments and officers of the two institutions. limited government legal staff could not include in their delegations foreign lawyers hired to advise them on their cases. While the appellate body and one of the panels, have ruled in recent cases to permit such lawyers to participate, this is one example of a rule that inadvertedly may prejudice developing country participation in the WTO. There may be others which should be reviewed, especially in the context of the forthcoming review of the DSB.
Fifth, the international community should place higher priority to the more effective integration of the developing countries in the international trading system and their participation in the WTO.
While many developing countries have made great strides in this connection, institutional weaknesses are glaring and impose serious constraints in many others. Donors in general, and the Bretton Woods institutions, UNDP, WTO, UNCTAD and the ITC in particular, should increase their support and assistance to well co-ordinated programs of institutional development that enhance the capacity of developing countries --whether in the Least Developed country list or not --to participate effectively in the international trading system, and to permit them to meet their obligations in the WTO. Such an institutional strengthening is a sine qua non for effective representation of developing country interests in the WTO, as well as for the accession to the WTO of countries which are not yet members.
Finally, keeping in mind that the WTO is not a development assistance institution, it would still appear desirable that WTO review the resources it allocates from its own budget to: (a) staffing of analyses on issues of interest to developing country members, (b) technical assistance to developing countries to enable them to discharge the obligations entailed by membership in the Organization and Issues of interest to developing countries and strenghtening their institutional capacity involve many parts of the Organization and its Secretariat. It is important that the Secretariat be adequately staffed to handle these matters, while preserving the character of the WTO as a member driven institution.' Also, ensuring adequate resources to provide technical assistance does not necessarily mean that the WTO should increase its own staffing for undertaking technical assistance activities.
It does mean that the WTO should allocate an appropriate amount of resources from its budget to the tasks of supporting effective participation of all its membership in its activities and assisting needy non-members in their accession process, so as to become a truly global institution.
2 The Development Division ( with only about two and one half professional staff, excluding the Director, working on strictly development issues) is only one of several Divisions working on issues of actual or potential importance to developing countries; others include Trade Policies Review, Trade and Environment, Agriculture and Textiles.Many developing countries also believe that greaterprogress is needed in staffing the WTO Secretariat with developing country nationals in order to improve the staff's understanding of developing country problems. 
